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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred by Utah Code 
Ann § 78-2-2(3)(j) and by virtue of 78-2-2(4) pursuant to the 
Order of the Utah Supreme Court transferring this case to the 
Court of Appeals for disposition dated April 23, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Stuckers claim that the actions of Summit 
County somehow constitute an unlawful amendment of a subdivision 
plat, which was not presented at the trial court level and is 
raised for the first time on appeal, is untimely and therefore 
not properly before this court and should be deemed to have been 
waived. 
2. Whether the Stuckers' arguments that their permit was 
denied in an arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory fashion and 
that Summit County should be estopped from denying them a 
building permit were also not properly presented and reserved at 
the trial court level and are therefore effectively raised for 
the first time on appeal and should be regarded as untimely, 
deemed to have been waived and not properly before this Court for 
consideration on the merits. 
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3. Whether the trial court correctly determined, based on 
the undisputed facts, that the Stuckers do not have a vested 
right or entitlement to receive a development permit or building 
permit for commercial use of the property in question because 
they had not acquired an ownership interest in the property and 
had not initiated any actual use, physical construction of a 
commercial facility or even submitted an application for 
commercial use of the property in question prior to the adoption 
of the applicable provisions of the Snyderville Basin Development 
Code. 
4. Whether the policy of requiring a compatibility 
assessment determination under the Snyderville Basin Development 
Code of Summit County is a constitutionally valid exercise of the 
police power, both facially and as applied to the Stuckers' 
application. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, this court 
views the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
losing party and gives no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions, reviewing them for correctness. However, only those 
pleadings and exhibits which were properly filed with the trial 
court and before the trial judge at the time the decision was 
made should be considered on appeal. Issues which were not 
presented to the trial court and are raised for the first time on 
appeal are untimely and should be deemed to have been waived. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
1. The Snyderville Basin Development Code (R. at 177-184, 
which includes relevant excerpts from the Snyderville Basin 
Development Code). 
2. Development Code of Summit County (R. at 204-206, which 
includes relevant excerpts of the Development Code of Summit 
County. 
3. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs/Appellants (hereinafter "the Stuckers") filed a 
motion for summary judgment in the trial court based on a claim 
of a vested right or entitlement to receive a development permit, 
building permit or other form of authorization or approval for 
commercial use of Lot 225 in the Highland Estates Subdivision in 
Summit County, State of Utah. The Stuckers further challenged 
the legislative discretion of the Board of Summit County 
Commissioners in the adoption of certain provisions of the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code, which require a compatibility 
assessment of proposed uses as an absolute policy that must be 
complied with prior to receiving approval for a development 
permit. 
Defendant/Appellee Summit County (hereinafter "Summit 
County") filed a cross-motion for summary judgment contending 
that plaintiffs had not acquired an ownership interest in the 
property and had not initiated any actual use, started 
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construction or even made application for commercial use of the 
property in question until some five (5) years after the adoption 
of a new zoning ordinance for that geographic area of Summit 
County, and therefore had not created any vested right or 
entitlement to receive a development permit or building permit 
for any such commercial use. Summit County further argued that 
the Snyderville Basin Development Code is a constitutionally 
valid exercise of the police power, both facially and as applied 
to these facts and circumstances, and provides adequate 
boundaries on the exercise of discretion by the Summit County 
Planning Commission in its implementation. 
Following the submission of the cross-motions for summary 
judgment by the parties and supporting memoranda and exhibits 
with respect to these motions, the district court heard oral 
argument on the motions on October 15, 1991. Thereafter the 
District Court issued a minute entry dated October 30, 1991, 
denying the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granting 
the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Summary Judg-
ment And Order Of Dismissal was signed and entered by the trial 
court on December 16, 1991. The Highland Estates Homeowners 
Association, Kathy Mears, Dave Rich, Elwayne Daly and Sue Smith 
were named as additional defendants at the trial court level but 
were dismissed by stipulation pursuant to an Order Of Dismissal 
dated March 24, 1992. The Stuckers are only appealing the entry 
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of summary judgment dismissing their complaint against 
defendant/appellee Summit County. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Response to the Stuckers' "Factual Background." 
Summit County disagrees with certain statements set forth in 
the Stuckers' "Factual Background" set forth at pages 4 - 8 of 
Appellant's Brief. First and foremost, the entire 
characterization of this as simply an application for a building 
permit is erroneous and misleading. The compatibility 
assessment process set forth in Chapter 5.6.3 of the Snyderville 
Basin Development Code is the land use and zoning component of 
the development approval process (see Statement of Fact No. 4 at 
p. 7, infra). Only after the proposed use of the property has 
been found to be reasonably compatible and sensitive to the 
immediate environment and neighboring uses is such an application 
reviewed to determine its compliance with other technical 
requirements, such as the Uniform Building Code. 
Paragraph 1 also mischaracterizes the prior recording of the 
Highland Estates Subdivision plat as constituting a "zone 
change." The undisputed facts reveal that no zoning ordinance 
was adopted in Summit County until 1977 (f 1 at p. 7, infra). 
Paragraph 4 of the Stuckers' factual background confuses the 
subdivision approval process as applied to minimum lot sizes with 
specific allowable use determinations for individual lots. 
Paragraph 6 sets forth information not supported in the record 
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and which is otherwise irrelevant. Specifically, there is no 
information in the record to support the conclusion that the lot 
in question is located within the commercial "node" known as 
Silver Creek Junction as that term is used in Chapter 5.7.3 of 
the Snyderville Basin Development Code. Beyond that, the 
language in question simply encourages the clustering of 
commercial uses in such areas but does not assure or guarantee 
any such entitlement. Furthermore, a letter from a prior 
planning director to a previous owner stating a personal opinion 
with respect to the preferred use of the property in question is 
completely irrelevant to Summit County's response to a specific 
development application made over a year later. 
B. Summit County's Statement of Undisputed Facts. 
The following facts are specifically supported by references 
to the record as reflected in Summit County's initial memorandum 
in support of its motion for summary judgment in the District 
Court and were not controverted or disputed by plaintiffs in 
their memoranda filed at the District Court level. (R. at 207). 
1. The first zoning ordinance ever adopted by Summit 
County was the Development Code of Summit County, which became 
effective August 1, 1977 (R. at 157, 173). 
2. On March 13, 1975, the Summit County Commission adopted 
the provisions of the Snyderville Basin Development Code which 
became effective on April 15, 1985, and applied to all uses 
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within the Snyderville Basin. The property in question is 
located within the Snyderville Basin. (R. at 157, 177). 
3. Prior to the adoption of the Snyderville Basin 
Development Code in 1985, the parcel in question was zoned for 
commercial use. (R. at 157). 
4. The Snyderville Basin Development Code established the 
Snyderville Basin Zoning District and replaced traditional "hard" 
zoning designations of property with a permit system, sometimes 
referred to as "performance zoning," which requires that all 
proposed developments within the district satisfy certain 
"absolute policies" prior to receiving a development permit, to 
include a compatibility assessment. Under the provisions of 
Chapter 5.6.3 of the Snyderville Basin Development Code, that 
compatibility assessment process occurs prior to the formal 
filing of an actual application for a development permit and 
includes a neighborhood meeting. In those circumstances in which 
a developer and affected property owners have not been able to 
reach a consensus of opinion regarding compatibility of the 
proposed use of the site, a public hearing is held before the 
Planning Commission prior to a decision being made by the 
Planning Commission as to whether the proposed project is 
compatible with surrounding development and should be allowed to 
proceed. (R. at 157-158, 177-184, which includes relevant 
excerpts from the Snyderville Basin Development Code). 
- 7 -
5. The Stuckers obtained an ownership interest in Lot 225 
of the Highland Estates Subdivision on or about March 6, 1990, 
and the lot is held in a joint tenancy including Steve Stucker, 
Harold Stucker and Lucy Stucker. (R. at 158, 186-189). 
6. On or about May 31, 1990, the Stuckers submitted an 
application proposing to develop the site in question as "a 
limited production, high quality auto body and detail shop." 
(R. at 158, 191). 
7. Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 4.1(a) of the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code, the County Commission 
delegated to the Planning Director and staff the authority to 
issue what ctre referred to as Class I Development Permits, unless 
the director determines it would be "in the best interests of the 
public" that the application be handled as a Class II permit with 
direct revi€>w by the Planning Commission. Consistent with his 
prior habit, practice, custom and routine, Planning Director Jim 
Peterson determined that there was a considerable amount of 
interest in the proposed development and therefore referred it to 
the Plannincf Commission as a Class II permit. (R. at 158-159, 
174-175). 
8. In conformance with the provisions of the Snyderville 
Basin Development Code, a neighborhood compatibility assessment 
meeting was held on or about August 2, 1990 to review the 
proposed use of the property. A consensus of opinion regarding 
the proposed development was not reached, and therefore, a public 
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hearing was held before the Summit County Planning Commission on 
or about August 28, 1990, to facilitate a full discussion of the 
issues relative to the compatibility assessment determination. 
On the basis of the issues raised at the neighborhood 
compatibility meeting and the public hearing before the Planning 
Commission, including but not limited to, concern regarding 
whether increased traffic, curves and blind spots on the road 
providing access to the property would represent safety hazards, 
incompatibility of this commercial use with surrounding 
residential uses and the country atmosphere in the vicinity, 
possible lowering of property values, conflicts over increased 
traffic and school bus routing and other related issues, the 
Planning Commission denied the project because of compatibility 
issues. (R. at 159-160, 193-197). 
9. On or about October 3, 1990, the Summit County 
Commission denied plaintiffs' appeal from the decision of the 
Planning Commission on the absolute policy of the compatibility 
with neighboring uses. (R. at 160, 199-202). 
10. Under the Development Code of Summit County, which was 
adopted in 1977 and would have been applicable to the property in 
question prior to the adoption of the Snyderville Basin 
Development Code in 1985, an owner or developer of a long-term 
multi-phased project could request a change in zoning for the 
entire project and have a project master plan approved by the 
Planning Commission and Board of County Commissioners and enter 
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into an agreement to change the zoning for the entire project, 
with such zoning to become effective at such time as each phase 
of the project has been approved for final platting. Other 
"developments" defined in the Code as any "man made change to 
improved or unimproved real estate. . .," could also petition for 
amendments to the master plan or zone amendments. (R. at 160, 
204-206). 
11. At the time of the adoption of the Snyderville Basin 
Development Code in 1985, any property where "specific develop-
ment" as thcit term is defined in the code, had actually been 
initiated through master plan or zone change approval prior to 
the effective date of the Snyderville Basin Development Code 
would be regarded as having been "grandfathered" and have the 
option to either continue such development under the provisions 
of the old Development Code or submit an application for a 
development permit under the provisions of the Snyderville Basin 
Development Code. (R. at 160-161, 177-184). 
12. The Highland Estates Subdivision Plat had previously 
been recordcid, but no "development" as that term is defined in 
the applicable ordinances had occurred or been initiated on 
Lot 225 of the Highland Estates Subdivision prior to the adoption 
of the Snyderville Basin Development Code. (R. at 161). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Stuckers have raised for the first time on appeal a 
number of new arguments not properly presented or reserved at the 
trial court level. Those include the contention that the actions 
of Summit County regarding their application somehow constitute 
an improper amendment of a previously recorded subdivision plat, 
the claim that their permit was denied in an arbitrary, 
capricious and discriminatory fashion and that Summit County 
should be estopped from denying them a building permit for 
commercial use of the property. None of these arguments were 
properly framed, presented or reserved at the trial court level 
and are therefore untimely, should be deemed waived and should 
not be considered on the merits by this court. 
2. The Stuckers do not have a vested right or entitlement 
for commercial use of the property in question because they had 
not acquired an ownership interest, had not initiated any actual 
use and had not begun construction or had even made application 
for commercial use of the property in question until five full 
years after the adoption of the applicable provisions of the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code, including the compatibility 
assessment policy challenged here. The trial court correctly 
determined that Summit County was entitled to prevail on that 
issue as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts. The 
Stuckers have further alleged that Summit County should be 
estopped from denying their building permit, but the doctrine of 
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equitable estoppel is only available as a defense which may be 
asserted against enforcement by a governmental agency under 
exceptional circumstances and does not apply to the issues 
presented in this appeal. 
3. The compatibility assessment policy set forth in 
Chapter 5.6.3 of the Snyderville Basin Development Code of Summit 
County is a constitutionally valid exercise of the police power, 
both facially and as applied to the facts and circumstances of 
this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE ACTIONS OF SUMMIT COUNTY REGARDING THE STUCKERS' APPLICATION 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE A VACATION, ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF 
A PREVIOUSLY RECORDED SUBDIVISION PLAT AND 
SUCH A CLAIM WAS NOT PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL 
AND IS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND THEREFORE 
IS UNTIMELY AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT 
It is axiomatic that a party may not present an issue for 
the first time on appeal. The Stuckers belatedly add an entirely 
new and unrelated claim that the actions of Summit County in 
processing their application for a development permit somehow 
amount to a vacation, alteration or amendment of a previously-
recorded subdivision plat in violation of state statutory 
provisions dictating the proper procedure and grounds for such 
amendments or changes. No where in the Stuckers7 pleadings at 
the trial court level or even their docketing statement filed in 
this appeal is there so much as a passing mention of any such 
issue. As this court has repeatedly stated, it "will not address 
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an issue for the first time on appeal.11 Wurst v Department of 
Employment Security, 818 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah App. 1991). 
(Citations omitted). Any such claim is therefore untimely, not 
properly before the Court and should be deemed to have been 
waived, therefore precluding this court from considering the 
merits of the argument on appeal. 
Even if this Court to address the subdivision plat amendment 
issue on its merits, even a cursory review reveals a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of subdivision plat approval and 
recordation which fails as a matter of law. The argument 
confuses land use planning and zoning activity which control the 
uses of land with subdivision regulations and control that 
facilitate the orderly development and sale of property and 
assure that such developments are designed to accommodate the 
needs of future occupants of the subdivision, particularly with 
respect to the identification and dedication of public streets, 
alleys and other public places. Subdivision plats do not 
generally mention, identify, create or otherwise purport to 
control the uses of land that may be made within the platted 
parcels. The only direct mention of zoning in conjunction with 
subdivision layout is to assure that each lot in a subdivision 
meets the frontage width and area requirements of the applicable 
zone. Utah Code Ann. § 57-5-3. It defies common sense to 
suggest that Summit County's approval or denial of an application 
for a specific use of a lot within a platted subdivision somehow 
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constitutes a vacation, alteration or amendment of a previously 
recorded plat. 
II. 
THE STUCKERS' ARGUMENTS SET FORTH IN THEIR BRIEF CONTENDING 
THAT THEIR PERMIT WAS DENIED IN AN ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND 
DISCRIMINATORY FASHION AND THAT SUMMIT COUNTY SHOULD BE 
ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THEM A BUILDING PERMIT FOR COMMERCIAL USE 
OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION WERE ALSO NOT PROPERLY 
PRESENTED AND RESERVED AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL, ARE 
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND ARE THEREFORE 
UNTIMELY AND NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT FOR CONSIDERATION 
ON THE MERITS. 
Neither in their pleadings or in their arguments at the 
trial court level, nor in their docketing statement filed in 
conjunction with this appeal have the Stuckers ever argued that 
their application for a permit to operate an auto body repair and 
paint facility was denied in an arbitrary, capricious and 
discriminatory fashion. This represents an entirely new 
argument which effectively shifts the focus from a "facial 
challenge" to the legislative discretion and authority of the 
Board of Summit County Commissioners in adopting the 
compatibility assessment policy set forth in Chapter 5.6.3 of the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code to an "as applied challenge" 
to the specific basis for the decision of the Summit County 
Planning Commission in denying the project on compatibility 
issues. In a similar fashion, while the estoppel argument may 
have received passing mention in the pleadings and oral argument 
at the trial court level, it was never sufficiently raised and 
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review on appeal. 
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pronouncements that appellate courts shoul d not consider issues 
raised for the first time on appeal apply with equal force and 
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arguments oi I the meri ts, 
1
 Illustratively, had such a challenge been made at the 
trial court level, Summit County would have provided a 
comprehensive discussion of the cases defining the appropriate 
standard of judicial review of similar types of local land use 
decisions. Generally, the courts review the record of the 
proceedings below to determine if it discloses a reasonable basis 
for the decision in question, or in the alternative, whether the 
action is so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious. 
Xanthos v Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032 
(Utah 1984). 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT THE STUCKERS DO NOT HAVE A VESTED RIGHT OR ENTITLEMENT 
FOR COMMERCIAL USE OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION 
AND THE DEFENSE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS NOT AVAILABLE 
TO AFFIRMATIVELY COMPEL ISSUANCE OF THE REQUESTED APPROVAL. 
A. VESTED RIGHTS ANALYSIS. 
The Stuckers did not acquire an ownership interest, initiate 
any actual use, begin construction or even make an application 
for commercial use of the property in question prior to the 
adoption of the compatibility assessment provisions of the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code and therefore, do not have a 
vested right or entitlement to receive a development permit or 
building permit for commercial use of the property. 
The Stuckers claim a vested right to commercial use of Lot 
225 in the Highland Estates Subdivision on the basis of a 
tortured interpretation of prior zoning designations of the 
parcel and certain "grandfathering" provisions of the Snyderville 
Basin Development Code. The Stuckers7 claims regarding vested 
rights, "grandfathering," nonconforming uses and estoppel rely on 
a mischaracterization of those legal concepts and a 
misinterpretation of the applicable Summit County Ordinances.2 
2
 Although the Stuckers did not object to the form or 
content of the Summary Judgment And Order Of Dismissal entered by 
the trial court in this matter, they now belatedly challenge the 
trial court's failure to further explain the basis of its ruling. 
That failure to object or move to correct any oversight precludes 
review on appeal. Alford v Utah League of Cities & Towns, 791 
P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In this instance, the trial court 
also substantially complied with Rule 52(a) by stating that it 
agreed with the argument and citation of authorities in Summit 
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as a t nr PL*hi 11 ii • i|M'"'il mil, mij i \n liMl nui »> I «i """vested 
rights" claim should it- prefaced with the recognition that 
general]v preliminary activity prior to obtaining a permit 
t:j i v e s speci f i c • u s e I i :i a zoning 
district ** v . ;.-: Nur./:&a: Corporations, § 25,155 (1976). 
The Utah Supreme Court has previous] y rejected the major i ty 
rule i lati oi ia ] ] y u hi cl :i would permit denial of an applicatj on based 
on subsequently enacted zoning regulations. However, in order to 
obtain any vested rights; i inder I Jtah 3 a/w ai I acti ia.1 a p p I J rat. KIII i s 
required for a specifi c use of the proper ty which complies with 
the requirements in effect at the time i t j s submitted in order 
t i' tjht /t i n VMS1, *M! I I gt i t s :i ! l a pax t i ci i] a r c ievel opmonl. si:hc»M< < «i 
proposed use. Western Land Equities Inc. v City of Logan, 6; 
P. 2d 3 88, 3 91 • 3 96 (Uta * l » ^na^rity opinion ^ 
that case j II iisti ce Stewc - J * 
a 1 1 property is 1 lelci suk-j^ * ' easonable exercise < i s~ 
zoning authority pursuant r 4i^ ^ ? t p u -r* power and was 
. . - nq 
i nticipated future zoning pi M t * - submissic : * r ' ,aL 
application for a specific use of the property i 1 P 2d at 3 92 
11' i t i n^ Avon Communi t y Developers, li ic, v South coast Regional 
Commission, 553 P.2d 546 (Ca. 1978)) 
County's Memoranda. (R, at 2 88-2 8 9 ) ; Neerings v Utah State Bar, 
817 P. 2d 320 (Utah 1.99] ) . 
No such vested rights or entitlements are created by prior 
zoning desiccations of parcels of property belonging to previous 
owners. Plciintiffs in the instant case do not claim to have 
acquired any interest in the property for the purposes of this 
analysis until March of 1990, five full years after the adoption 
of the Snyderville Basin Development Code and the compatibility 
assessment provisions at issue here. 
Although the Highland Estates Subdivision was recorded prior 
to the adoption of any zoning ordinance in Summit County, that 
does not create any "vested right" in a subsequent purchaser of a 
particular lot within the recorded plat to a specific zoning 
designation or use of that lot until the individual obtains an 
ownership interest and initiates an application in support of a 
specific development proposal. In the Western Land Equities 
decision, Justice Stewart clearly identified the main focus of 
any inquiry about vested rights or estoppel as being "substantial 
reliance" by the owner, tested by the existence of some actual 
physical construction or official approval by the governmental 
entity in question. Preconstruction activity such as the 
execution of architectural drawings, the clearing of land, the 
widening of roads, preparation of plans, conducting of boundary 
surveys, and actions of a similar nature were identified as "not 
sufficient to create a vested right . . ." 617 P.2d at 391-392. 
The fundamental flaw in the Stucker's approach to this 
entire analysis is to confuse the protection of the right to file 
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a subdivision plat and conform to minimum lot size, area, 
frontage and setback requirements with the vesting or * :.giv 
make a particular designated use ul HI y I .it.tc ci lot. Nor 
authorities relied on by the Stuckers support the proposition 
that subsequently enacted zoning regulations do ODD'* r.o 
e x i s t i n q p 1. 111 r»11 11 \ t /. *". i» I f "" t 11 v y f 1 < \ 11111 | • -
such lots because they lack necessary minimum siz^, rentage 
or similar physical requirements. That is t* separate -'-t 
d ii a I I! U'Wdli' 11 - I,JI 
of such platted lots. 
The Development Code of Summit County which was adopted in 
- ::.- . , : - '*:•- J :..f, •• of the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code i -;
 2 addressed 
"grandfathering" or the creation c : ested rightf^ 
contex t: of owners or developers oJ ;>ng-term multi-phased 
project" which has received approval ' . separate specific 
project maste -m irom the Summi* . ' * 
(K , at 204-iuu/ . 
The Stuckers confuse this very specific provision dealing 
* ' approved master plans for* pa i* t i < *u 1 -i i pmi^fts with (foneral 
county-wide master planning designating broad ranges of uses for 
a] 1 property located within the Snyderville Basin. Taking that 
analysis *• LUIS J.ugica 1 cone] i isi on wc i i] d resi I] t i n the ci: eati on 
of a vested right or entitlement for ever y parcel of property i n 
the entire County in perpetuity based on whatever original 
historical designation was made at the time of the adoption of 
the first master plan for the area. Such an interpretation would 
totally emasculate the ability of Summit County to reasonably 
regulate land use within its borders and is completely contrary 
to any reasonable interpretation of the statutory provisions in 
question or specific ordinances adopted by Summit County. 
With the adoption of the Snyderville Basin Development Code 
in 1985, only property where specific development had actually 
been initiated pursuant to project master plans approved by the 
Summit County Planning Commission for long-term multi-phased 
projects under the old Development Code are "grandfathered" and 
allowed to proceed under that old code. The provisions of the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code, as supported by the Statement 
of Intent regarding § 1.3, articulate only those limited vested 
rights. (R. at 177-179). It is obvious that no vested right or 
entitlement is intended to be created in the future purchase of 
any specific parcel or individual lot. To hold otherwise would 
represent an impermissible intrusion on the legislative 
discretion and authority of the Board of Commissioners of Summit 
County in local land use and zoning matters, which the courts of 
this state have consistently cautioned against. Crestview-
Holladay Homeowners Association, Inc. v Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 
1150, 1152 (Utah 1976); Gavland v Salt Lake County, 358 P.2d 633 
(Utah 1961); Dowse v Salt Lake City Corp., 255 P.2d 723 (Utah 
1953). 
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1 V I? I I I I I II I I fc i 1 ll IU b * * L 1 ! t U 11111 ( <1 Ti C t " : i I* 111 * J « < 1 i 0 1 1 J 111J i I I * I I M11 1 £> 
pending at the ti me an application was submitted and the 
applicant was aware of the proposed change, - vested right or 
eniL 11 lenieni is ri edited raeiel1, by ilic« I ill - *n arm': c a t i o n r o r 
a permit under those particular facts and circumstances. 
Scherbel v Salt Lake City Corp , 758 P. 2d 8 9 ' ' ' "•a> » 9 8 8 ) , 
The undisputed facts adduced at +-*<= +*v- ., level 
establish that the Stuckers did ;.. K become the owners of the lot 
in ••*-•< : * .)»;* inn 11 I n 
make commercia. ., - .•; the propert - . . * * , , s<^irs a f t er 
the adoption or appl icable provisions .;* *. \< Snydervi l le Basin 
D e v * - . - « i i f i ra 
matter provision. * IKJ Snyderville Basin 
Development Code appl i ".v- Stuckers, deluding the 
coin) (at it'll I i i v t i s s i 'SSi iHin t pa I in y , 
B THE THEORY OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS ONLY 
AVAILABLE AS A DEFENSE WHICH MAY BE ASSERTED 
AGAINST A GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY UNDER 
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND DOES NOT APPLY 
TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED INTHIS APPEAL, 
The Stuckers allege that Summit County shouJ d be "estopped 
from denying the plaintiffs their builrlinq permit." 
(Appe 1 I ant « '" Bt let (it Mi |i Tiir [ irupo*.. tt J um is without merit: ( nr 
n number of reasons. First, although the issue may have been 
mentionec passing in pleadings and oral argument dt urv " "ial 
coi ir t 1 €• w. iit,»i/tMt i»;of f i ci ei itl y r a i sed to preserve - -
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appeal. Illustratively, see, Shire Development v Frontier 
Investments. 799 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Secondly, while the theory of equitable estoppel is 
recognized cis an affirmative defense to governmental enforcement 
of zoning lciws under exceptional circumstances, it is not an 
alternative means for seeking extraordinary relief.3 The 
Stuckers now attempt to use this equitable defense as a basis for 
compelling the issuance of land use approval by Summit County. 
Specifically, the Stuckers request that Summit County somehow "be 
estopped" from denying the plaintiffs their building permit. 
This approach represents a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the concept of equitable estoppel, and confuses it with the 
separate and distinct theory of zoning estoppel which has 
previously been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. In Western 
Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980), 
Justice Stewart carefully reviewed the theory of zoning estoppel 
before rejecting it in favor of a vested rights analysis. 617 
P.2d at 392-393. 
In the present case, the Stuckers seek to use the doctrine 
of estoppel to compel Summit County to grant their application 
for commercial use of the property. This tactic amounts to 
nothing morei than a subterfuge for the Stuckers to reassert their 
deficient vetsted rights claim in an attempt to present it in a 
3
 Utah County v Baxter, 635 P.2d 61 (Utah 1981); Utah 
County v Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980); Salt Lake County v 
Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976). 
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in<:11• e 1; a v i:> I' a 1,i J e I m \ I \ I .i( i ei;| u e s t I: c>j e >,; I;, t" a o r" d i n a r y r e 1 j e 1 JI i the 
form of a Writ of Mandamus may be an appropriate vehicle for 
obtaining review of governmental 1 and use decisions under 
appropriate cii i: cumstances. Davis County v Clearfield City, 7 56 
P.2d 7 04 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). However, that i s not how the 
issues were framed at the trial court level in this casi:1 I Ion* 
importantly such a belated attempt to reframe the issues should 
not confuse the fundamental vested ri ghts analysis which clearly 
demons!::!:: a t e s t h a t tl: le t::::ii: i a I n nn: t: cor r e c t ] y determi i led Si iiiiiiii t 
County was entitled t iudgment on those issues as a matter of 
law (pp. 16- 211 , supra j , 
Fi ii: ther mor e , • it i i zoi il i: lq and I  and u .'•:.*• • r n s e s , t h e d e f e n s e ol 
equitable estoppel i s onl y available under exceptional 
circumstances, not presented here, "such as the i ntentional 
d i s v i' i in 111r11 t v a 111) J 11 • a t i o 11 1 1 111 > 111 i I in. i m v , " U t a h c o u n t y v 
Baxter
 f 6 3 b P , 2 c J i > 1, b b (Utah I(iHl), All 1 andowner s have an 
affirmative duty inquire and confer with local zoning 
authorities i:e< - • uses of the property that, would be 
permitted and the doctrine can only be evoked where it can IK? 
demonstrated that ] oca] 1 and \ ise and zoni ng authorities committed 
an a f f i r mat i /o ac Il:: o r om :i ssi oi :i I lpoi :i w I ilc'l i a property owner re . ied 
in making substantial changes in position or incurring extensive 
expenses. Utah County v Young, 615 p.2d 1265, 1267-1268 (Utah 
1980). 
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IV. 
THE SNYDERVILLE BASIN DEVELOPMENT CODE OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER, 
BOTH FACIALLY AND AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE, AND 
SETS ADEQUATE BOUNDARIES ON THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION 
IN APPLYING THE ABSOLUTE POLICY OF COMPATIBILITY ASSESSMENT. 
The Stuckers contend that Chapter 5.6.3 of the Snyderville 
Basin Development Code establishing a compatibility assessment 
process based on specific criteria as an absolute policy that 
must be satisfied before any proposed development may receive 
approval for a permit is somehow "an impermissible criterion." 
The specific basis for this legal challenge proceeds under the 
somewhat vaguely-defined theory that the procedures and 
applicable criteria in the Snyderville Basin Development Code for 
assessing compatibility somehow constitute an improper delegation 
of authority to neighbors and adjoining property owners. 
It has long been recognized by courts at both the federal 
and state level that considerable flexibility and deference 
should be afforded local planning and zoning authorities in 
adopting land use regulations. Village of Euclid v Ambler 
Realty Co.. 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Berman v Parker, 348 U.S. 26 
(1954). 
All presumptions favor the validity and reasonableness of 
the zoning regulations adopted by local governmental authorities 
and the burden is clearly on the party seeking judicial relief to 
establish that the ordinance in question does not promote the 
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*..-.. *• , -M : - • * - ---r* the community. 
.JS Zoning and Land Planning, §§ ] -31J 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed this same issue on i 
number of pri or occasi oris ai id repeatedly emphasized the narrow 
scope of judicial review, whi ch is limited to determining whether 
the actions of the local legislati ve - i I. I c c j a II , 
arbitrary, discriminatory or capricious.11 Crestview-Holladay 
Homeowners Association, Inc. v Enah Floral Company, 545 P.2d 
l i b n , i ir>,> n i n .ill il» ' h i 
As Justice Tuckett stated the proposition I n the Crestview-
Holladay case: 
The prior decisions of this court without 
exception have laid down the rule that the exercise of 
the zoning power is a legislative function to be 
exercised by the legislative bodies of municipalities. 
The wisdom of the zoning plan, its necessity, the 
nature and boundaries of the district to be zoned are 
matters which lie solely in that discretion. It is the 
policy of this court as enunciated in its prior 
decisions it will avoid substituting Its judgment for 
that of the legislative body muni ci pal ity. 
545 P.2d at 2 2 52 
The need * - ^  DnsiderabJ flexibility in dp. 1 i neat \\v\ I hi 
pi:< . • - power to accommodate a wide range 
of concerns has a v,^ ; >nq o<- * ecognized, including the 
treatment <-• r^stheti •- a : -.i* * Having identified surli 1 •. J 
ranfj i .-•••. . . concerns; oli local zuruny nnd 1 =^d 
use officials, the quest:* becomes whether sufficient standards 
a r e a r t i c u l a t e d lu ymue d e c i s i o n makers .md pirnf-pr! lcindMwm?is 
from decisions which are arbitrary and capricious and have no 
relation to the public health, safety, morals or welfare. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also had occasion to address 
these concerns in a similar challenge dealing with the criteria 
for the issuance of conditional use permits. In Thurston v 
Cache County. 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981), the court upheld a 
vagueness challenge to a zoning ordinance dealing with 
conditional use permits. With respect to the ordinance being 
challenged in that case, the Court held: 
While it is true that a zoning ordinance must set 
some ascertainable boundaries on the exercise of 
discretion by a zoning authority, such boundaries are 
not required to be unduly rigid or detailed. A 
generalized exposition of overall standards or policy 
goals suffices to meet the inquiry and deliberation of 
the zoning authority, and to permit appellate review of 
its decision. 
626 P.2d at 443-444. 
The Stuckers myopic focus on the initial attempt to reach a 
consensus between the proposed land use and affected neighboring 
property owners mischaracterizes both the procedure and the 
applicable criteria that are specifically delineated in the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code as part of the compatibility 
assessment process. The failure to reach consensus between 
neighboring property owners and the applicant simply triggers an 
additional public hearing to be conducted by the Planning 
Commission. The decision about whether a project is compatible 
with surrounding property uses is ultimately made by the Planning 
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Commission t h e b a s i s oil I.IIIM I,T l i ter i a i d e n t i l l e d in I lit! 
o r d i n a n c e . 
Contrary tu uie osition of the Stuckers .in this case, the 
compatibility assessment poi --.. *nyderville Basin 
Development Code - specifical] , ntendeci :o foster consideration 
oi I hi:1 possibil ' . .. ' different impacts that 
may complement each other . traditional zoning does not 
allow Chapter i . i » - Snydervil. Basin Development Code 
de I eqa t es I i > I I =1 f > o n s 11» J 1 it y I i. 
determine whether development is reasonably compatible and 
sensit J< * eighboring uses based on a number of criteria, 
tc • traff i c ai: i ::iii|( ' or par k i ng, pedestrj an 
traffic, unsightly views, noise, artifici al lighting glare, 
potential water runoff problems, odoi : nuisance, air or water 
po] hit ion, rlinnq*.' in I In*1 t;hai"" di i ici ol L lie a r e a t„ak i mq (jpcii i:\paee 
l o s s of pr ivacy , • n a t u r a l v e g e t a t i o n ai id h i s t o r i c a l 1 y v a l u a b l e 
s i t e s . (R. a t 181-184) 
Ii I this process, the input neighbori i lg landowners is • :>J il y 
advisory in nature and therefore entirely consistent with Justice 
Hall's observation in the Thurston case: 
While it is true that the consent of neighboring 
landowners may not be made a criterion for the issuance 
or denial of a conditional use permit, there is no 
impropriety in the solicitation of or reliance upon, 
information which may be furnished by other landowners 
in the vicinity of the subject property at a public 
hearing. 
626 P. 2d at. .,-
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Under the provisions of the Snyderville Basin Development 
Code, the compatibility assessment process appropriately solicits 
input from neighboring property owners, but the ultimate decision 
as to whether the proposed development is reasonably compatible 
and sensitive to the immediate environment and surrounding 
neighborhood rests with the Summit County Planning Commission. 
Chapter 5.6.3 of the Snyderville Basin Development Code sets 
ascertainable limits on the parameters of the exercise of that 
discretion by identifying relevant topics to be discussed and 
suggesting relevant solutions to identified impacts. (R. at 181-
184). The trial court properly concluded, as a matter of law, 
that the ordinance does not impermissibly delegate the exercise 
of the zoning authority to surrounding property owners. 
The Stuckers' challenge to Chapter 5.6.3 of the Snyderville 
Basin Development Code as applied to their specific application 
for authorization to develop the site in question as a auto body 
and detail shop is equally without merit. As a threshold 
proposition, such a claim was not presented at the trial court 
level and is improperly raised for the first time on appeal (see 
pp. 12-15, supra). Nonetheless, the undisputed facts establish 
that the neighborhood compatibility assessment meeting held on 
August 2, 1990 and the public hearing held before the Summit 
County Planning Commission on August 28, 1990 identified a number 
of significant concerns tracking the criteria established in the 
ordinance to support the conclusion that the proposed development 
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was not reasonably compatible with and sensitive to the immediate 
environment and neighboring uses. The undisputed facts 
established in the record identify concerns and issues including, 
but not limited to, increased traffic, curves and blind spots on 
the road providing access to the property that may represent 
safety hazards, incompatibility of this proposed commercial use 
with surrounding residential uses and the country atmosphere in 
the vicinity, possible lowering of neighboring property values, 
conflicts over increased traffic and school bus routing and other 
related issues. (R. at 193-197). The Stuckers are simply 
disappointed at the outcome and are asking this Court to 
substitute its judgment for that of local planning and land use 
officials. That approach should be rejected and the decision of 
the trial court upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The Stuckers are perhaps understandably disappointed that 
they have not been able to receive approval for their intended 
use of the property in question as an auto body repair and paint 
facility. However, the trial court correctly determined on the 
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basis of the undisputed facts that Summit County is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Based on all the arguments set 
forth above, that decision should be upheld. 
DATED this / / day of September, 1992. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
by yflfl A 73^i^~~" 
Jod^ W/Burnett 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Summit County 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of September, 1992, 
four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's 
Brief were served by mail, postage prepaid, to 
plaintiffs/appellants' attorney, addressed as follows: 
Robert Felton 
310 South Main 
Suite 1305 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
^^ur4 t t l3 Jodyj 
Attpfne^ for Defendant/Appellee 
15429 
- 30 -
